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the case of Korea. Estonia experienced a severe banking crisis in 1998 and 1999. In May 
2001, the Estonian Parliament adopted the Financial Supervisory Authority. Before the Act, 
the supervision was split into the three traditional sets of institutions (banking, securities and 
insurance). The Bank of Estonia was responsible for state supervision of banking. Latvia 
experienced banking and financial crises in 1995 and in 1998. In July 2001, the Financial 
and Capital Market Commission was established, as a consolidated institution replacing the 
Bank of Latvia as the credit institutions’ supervisor, the Securities Market Commission, the 
Insurance Supervision Inspectorate. In Korea, until 1997, the central bank was responsible 
for banking supervision. Following the 1997 financial crisis, a presidential committee 
recommended a drastic overhaul of the organization of the central bank and the country’s 
supervisory structure. As a result, the former four financial supervisory authorities were 
combined into one integrated financial supervisory body, the Financial Supervisory 
Committee.  
Therefore, the degree of central bank involvement in supervision may influence the 
policymaker in his/her decision to alter the supervision concentration effect, according to 
an inverse relationship: the result may be the central bank fragmentation effect. 
 
5. Overall Central Bank Institutional Setting  
However, is it possible to separate the different causes that could explain the 
importance of the role that the central bank plays in supervision? In general, the three 
effects explaining the policymaker’s path dependent behaviour can depend on the central 
banker’s past behaviour or on the legal features. In other words, the relevance of the central 
bank involvement in supervision may hide the role of the central banker’s past 
performances or the key aspects of the monetary institutional setting. The behavioural 
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aspect and the institutional aspect are both potentially important. Furthermore, the two 
aspects are likely to be complementary. 
None of the three effects we distinguish is directly observable. Therefore, we use 
proxies. While the moral hazard effect can be called a purely economic concept, the other 
two are political economy by nature. Thus, in this paper we will concentrate on the legal 
aspect. Following again the rule-driven approach, we can try to identify the institutional 
rules – different from the central bank involvement – that could capture the explanations of 
the central bank fragmentation effect. 
First of all, the central bank’s institutional status quo in supervision matters if the 
monetary authority is characterized by a reputation endowment. The reputation of a central 
bank depends on the supervisory and monetary performance, on the one side, and on the 
overall institutional position, on the other side. Focusing on the legal rules, the central 
bank’s overall institutional position depends on the features of the monetary regime. In 
accordance with the literature as discussed in Freytag (2001), we argue that the quality of a 
monetary regime is reflected by its degree of commitment to price stability. We distinguish 
two related concepts of commitment, which we call monetary commitment (MOC) and 
central bank independence (CBI). The coding and weighting is presented in Table 1A and 
commented in Appendix 8.2. 
The index MOC is constructed using several factors, which can be grouped as follows: 
internal restrictions as set by central bank legislation, external constraints such as 
convertibility restriction, exchange rate arrangements and the like. For this purpose we 
propose the index of monetary commitment (MCO Index) (Table 1A), which modifies the 
indicator introduced in Freytag (2001), excluding the information on supervision rule. 
Hence: O ≤ MCO ≤ 1. If the index approaches zero, the level of commitment is very low. 
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The highest theoretically possible commitment is expressed by the value one. In other 
words: the higher MCO, the higher the potential overall reputation endowment of the 
central bank. The index is the weighted average of all the factors determining legal 
monetary commitment. These criteria are operationalised by using components with 
discrete outcomes having numerical coding between zero and one.  
The central bank legislation rules are covering only the internal dimension of the degree 
of monetary commitment, identifying the specific position of the central banker inside the 
state organization. This is reflected in the measure of central bank independence. The 
concept of central bank independence can capture the bureaucratic position of the central 
bank vis a vis the government, as well as the Parliament. Focusing again on the role of the 
rules, the central bank independence can be used to evaluate the specific bureaucracy effect 
that determines the policymaker’s attention on the role of the central bank in defining the 
supervision architecture. On this account we build up an index of central bank 
independence (CBI Index, Table 1A) being consistent with the measures of legal central 
bank independence, which are most influential on the literature, as the indices proposed in 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and in Cukierman (1992). If the index approaches 
zero, the level of independence is very low. The highest theoretically possible 
independence is expressed by the value one. Hence: O ≤ CBI ≤ 1; the higher CBI, the 
higher the specific bureaucratic power of the central bank.  
This leads us to the connection of sections five and six. We develop two competing 
hypotheses which both seem plausible. 
• First, the level of monetary commitment can be useful to evaluate the legal dimension 
of the overall central bank reputation endowment. High reputation encourages 
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policymakers to give the central bank much authority in supervision. Thus, the higher 
MOC, the higher central bank involvement, the lower FAC. 
• Second, the degree of central bank independence can be utilized to measure its specific 
legal bureaucratic power. If this power is high, the bank will be circumvented by the 
policymaker and not given a big role in financial authority. Therefore, the higher CBI, 
the lower the bank’s involvement, the higher FAC. 
Furthermore, in order to be rigorous we have to note that monetary commitment could 
be a proxy of both the reputation endowment effect and the bureaucracy effect; the same is 
true for the central bank independence (see the correlation index of 0.96 below). For these 
two reasons,  we will use the two variables separately in the econometric analyses. 
Summarizing, the institutional position of a central bank can be described using three 
different indicators: the degree of supervision involvement; the degree of monetary 
commitment; the degree of central bank independence. We note that on average the degree 
of supervision involvement is weakly and inversely correlated with the degree of monetary 
commitment (correlation index = - 0.16) and with the degree of independence (correlation 
index = - 0.14) while, not surprisingly,  the degree of monetary commitment is strongly and 
directly correlated with the degree of independence (correlation index = 0.96) (Table 6). 
We have to remember that the concept of central bank independence is part of the broader 
definition of monetary commitment; in fact the CBI index is the aggregate of seven of the 
twelve components of the MOC index.   
Note that in the econometric part we will use an index of central bank age (CBAGE 
Index) as alternative proxy of the reputation effect and/or the bureaucratic effect; the 
degree of central bank involvement is also weakly and inversely correlated with the central 
bank age (correlation index = -0.12).  
